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INTRODUCTION
The law of environmental standing has expanded dramatically
since its inception in 1972 with the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton.' At about the same
time, Congress lowered the standing hurdle for environmental
plaintiffs by incorporating citizen suit provisions into the enforce-
ment schemes of the Clean Air Act 2 and Clean Water Act,3 with
many other major federal environmental statutes adopting citi-
zen suit provisions shortly thereafter. These landmark develop-
ments in the judicial and legislative arenas offered individual and
organizational plaintiffs vastly enhanced access to the federal
courts to bring environmental challenges under the Administra-
* B.A., cum laude, University of Rochester, 1986; J.D., M.S.L., Vermont Law
School, 1989. Mr. Abate is an environmental law writer with the Manhattan law
firm of Berle, Kass & Case. He is an adjunct professor at Vermont Law School.
** B.S., Cornell University, 1990; J.D., cutm laude, Vermont Law School, 1993;
Member, New York State Bar. Mr. Myers's expertise lies in the field of environ-
mental enforcement. He has worked in this area for both government and non-
profit organizations.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Nigara Abate and Nancy
Greening in the preparation of this article.
1. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
2. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1990).
3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1990).
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tive Procedure Act4 (APA) and, more extensively, under the citi-
zen suit provisions of the major environmental statutes.5
To establish standing, Article III of the U.S. Constitution re-
quires a party to demonstrate: (1) an actual or threatened "in-
jury-in-fact"; (2) that the injury is traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) that the relief requested is likely to redress the
injury.6 In environmental cases, courts have recognized three
types of injury that may satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement:
substantive, informational, and procedural. Although substan-
tive injury has received the most attention in the courts and has
been the principal vehicle through which the doctrine of environ-
mental standing has evolved, there also has been a growing rec-
ognition of procedural and informational injury in the courts in
recent years. Environmental plaintiffs asserting any of the three
types of injury must satisfy the Article III standing requirements;
however, courts have failed to offer a clear explanation of what
distinguishes substantive injury from procedural and informa-
tional injury.
Substantive injury embraces those classes of harm that are not
grounded in the effects suffered from a deprivation of informa-
tion or a governmental entity's failure to follow required proce-
dures.7 Informational injury exists when the government or a
private party fails to provide or collect information, impairing an
individual's or organization's ability to obtain or disseminate in-
formation.8 Procedural injury is found when a governmental en-
tity's action or inaction violates a law under a statutory scheme in
which Congress has expressly or impliedly created an interest in
private individuals to affect such administrative decisions
through the law.9 In essence, procedural injury involves govern-
4. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). The APA gives an individual the right of judicial review
when that individual suffers legal wrong because of agency action or is adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.
5. See generally MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CrIzEN Surrs (1991);
JEFFREY G. MILLER, CmZEN Surrs: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLU-
TION CONTROL LAWS (1987).
6. Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). Without de-empha-
sizing the importance of the traceability and redressability components of the Arti-
cle III standing requirements, this Article focuses on the injury-in-fact requirement.
7. An in-depth analysis of substantive injury is beyond the scope of this article.
For a discussion of substantive injury in the environmental context, see Lisa M.
Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue Stand in
Environmental Litigation?, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 761, 765-71 (1993).
8. See infra part I.A.
9. See infra part I.B.
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ment failure to follow procedures designed to ensure that the
environmental consequences of governmental action are ade-
quately evaluated. 10
In 1989, despite a continuing trend of liberal interpretation of
environmental standing at the federal district and circuit court
levels," the Supreme Court began issuing a backlash of restric-
tive decisions for citizen-plaintiffs' challenges under federal envi-
ronmental statutes,12 culminating with the controversial decision
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.13 Championed by Justice
Scalia's restrictive approach toward environmental standing, the
decision in Defenders in 1992 is the most recent instance of the
Supreme Court's restriction of environmental plaintiffs' ability to
sue in the federal courts.
14
Even if the Supreme Court's substantive injury analysis in De-
fenders can be considered restrictive, 15 the Court's analysis does
not necessarily impair the viability of procedural and informa-
tional injury, since the latter two injuries are governed by differ-
ent and less restrictive doctrines. Thus, in the wake of Defenders,
procedural and informational injury offer a more promising
10. Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 931 (9th Cir. 1988)
modified 850 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1988); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671
(9th Cir. 1975).
11. See Michael A. Perino, Note, Justice Scalia: Standing, Environmental Law and
the Supreme Court, 15 B.C. ENvT. AnF. L. REv. 135, 144-48 (1987) (discussing for-
mer trend toward liberalization of standing requirements in environmental cases).
12. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (strict compliance with the
literal language of the 60-day notice requirement is a prerequisite to filing a citizen
suit); Lujan v. National wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)(members of environmen-
tal organization challenging Bureau of Land Management's land withdrawal review
program lack standing because affidavits alleging their use of lands "in the vicinity"
of the challenged projects lacked the requisite geographical specificity to sustain
substantive injury-in-fact).
13. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (hereinafter Defenders).
14. For a discussion of the restrictive effect of Defenders, see generally Patti A.
Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LANr
USE & ENv-rL. L. 343 (1993); Karin P. Sheldon, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: The
Supreme Court's Slash and Burn Approach to Environmental Standing, 23 ENVTL
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10031 (1993); Lisa M. Bromberg, Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Where Does the Standing Issue Stand in Environmental Litigation?. 16 A&I.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 761 (1993); James M. McElfish Jr., Drafting Standing Affidavits
After Defenders: In the Court's Own Words, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L last.)
10026 (1993).
15. At least two courts since Defenders have questioned this assumption. See
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting conten-
tion that Defenders established a "new, stricter burden on plaintiffs to establish with
specificity an injury-in-fact caused by a challenged government action"); see also
Resources Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1993).
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mechanism for the redress of environmental harms, particularly
when such harms fall within the scope of a substantive environ-
mental statute with a citizen suit provision.
Part one of this article examines the origins and development
of procedural and informational injury-in-fact, both of which
have their origins in case law addressing the environmental im-
pact statement (EIS) requirement under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA).16 Part one also discusses procedural
and informational injury claims under substantive environmental
statutes addressed in case law prior to the Defenders decision.
Part two begins with an analysis of the Eighth Circuit's deci-
sion in Defenders. It then examines the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court's reversal of the Eighth
Circuit, identifying the aspects of the decision that have provided
fertile ground for the post-Defenders courts to grant standing for
procedural and informational injury claims brought under fed-
eral environmental statutes.
Part three analyzes the effect of Defenders on plaintiffs' ability
to allege procedural and informational injury claims under
NEPA and under the citizen suit provisions of substantive envi-
ronmental statutes. First, cases involving procedural and infor-
mational injury under NEPA are examined. Next, part three
considers informational injury-in-fact under the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPRCA) 17 and ex-
plores the interplay between EPCRA's substantive statutory
mandate and its citizen suit provision. Part three then analyzes
the operative mechanisms of the Endangered Species Act and
argues that the Act's citizen suit provision is a powerful tool
through which plaintiffs can successfully assert informational and
procedural injury without being limited by NEPA case law or by
the Defenders decision. Finally, part three considers procedural
injury claims under RCRA, CERCLA, the Clean Water Act
(CWA), and the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).
16. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370b (1988 & Supp. II
1990).




THE LEGAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL
INJURY-IN-FACT.
A. Origins and Development of Informational Injury
To sustain standing under a theory of informational injury,
plaintiff organizations must demonstrate a plausible link between
their organization's informational purposes and the challenged
agency action. 18 Organizations whose primary function is to dis-
seminate information to their members may be injured by an
agency's failure to provide or collect such information.' 9 Such
organizations need not be the statutorily designated recipient of
information to suffer informational injury sufficient to confer
standing,20
Informational injury has its roots in NEPA.21 NEPA estab-
lishes a procedural framework to promote better-informed deci-
sions and to facilitate public participation. The informational
rights embodied in the EIS requirement are essential to fulfill
this purpose. Informational injury under NEPA is grounded in
the EIS's purpose to ensure that "relevant information will be
made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in
both the decision making process and the implementation of that
decision."22
A court first recognized informational injury under NEPA in
1973 in a footnote in Scientists' Institute for Public Information,
18. See, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
901 F.2d 107, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
19. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086
n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. See, e.g., Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1001 (1990) (plaintiff's deprivation of
information directed from one governmental agency to another found to be suffi-
cient injury on which to base standing).
21. The concept of informational injury can be traced back further to the citizen
suit provision of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1988).
NEPA documents are subject to this provision, which compels an agency to provide
requested information. NEPA's EIS requirement adds another dimension to this
informational focus by imposing a mandate on agencies to generate requested infor-
mation, rather than merely requiring that such agencies provide information already
in their possession. See Lawrence Gershwer, Note, Informational Standing Under
NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental Decision Making Process, 93 COLUM. L
REv. 996, 1005-6 (1993).
22. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332. 349 (1989).
1994]
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Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission. 3 The D.C. Circuit reasoned
that the plaintiff had suffered injury-in-fact 24 on the ground that
the Atomic Energy Commission's failure to comply with NEPA's
procedural mandates would impair one of the plaintiff's main
objectives - providing scientific and policy information to the
public.
Unlike the majority of the major federal environmental stat-
utes, however, NEPA is a procedural statute and lacks a citizen
suit provision. 5 Thus, although NEPA mandates that informa-
tion-based procedures be carried out, it does not vest citizens
with a statutorily authorized right to attempt to ensure that those
procedures are executed in accordance with NEPA's require-
ments. 6 With the notable exception of Colorado Environmental
Coalition v. Lujan,27 the lack of both substantive mandates and a
citizen suit provision have diluted the viability of informational
injury under NEPA. The D.C. Circuit has denied informational
standing in three recent cases under NEPA, thereby adding to
the uncertain status of informational standing under NEPA.
The first of these cases, Foundation on Economic Trends v.
Lyng,-8 involved a challenge brought against the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) for failing to prepare an EIS
on its germplasm preservation program. In dicta, the court
doubted the validity of informational injury, noting that courts
have "never sustained an organization's standing in a NEPA case
solely on the basis of 'informational injury.' "29
This skepticism fueled the denial of informational standing in
two subsequent NEPA cases in the D.C. Circuit.30 In Foundation
on Economic Trends v. Watkins, the court felt bound by Lyng,
23. Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1087 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
24. The court did not use the term "informational injury" to identify the type of
injury that plaintiff had suffered.
25. Informational standing claims under NEPA must be brought under the more
rigorous standard imposed by the APA. See supra note 4.
26. See infra part III.B.1 (discussing the effect of the substantive mandates and
citizen suit provision in EPCRA on informational standing cases).
27. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992); see also
infra part III.A.
28. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 84. The court further noted that" 'informational injury' . . . exists day in
and day out, whenever federal agencies are not creating information a member of
the public would like to have." Id.
30. Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992);
Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139
(D.D.C. 1992), aff'd, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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noting that the Lyng court had "recently reexamined the infor-
mational standing concept and found it wanting."131 Similarly, in
Public Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representa-
tive,32 the court interpreted Lyng to have overruled the prece-
dent33 that informational injury such as that asserted by Public
Citizen could support standing.34
Courts are much more receptive to standing based on informa-
tional injury under substantive statutes, especially substantive en-
vironmental statutes.35 In Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. SEC,36 plaintiff NRDC sought to compel the SEC to
broaden its policy regarding the disclosure of information on cor-
porate activities that affect the environment. 37 The federal dis-
trict court held that the SEC's narrow disclosure policy harmed
NRDC's interest "in protecting the environment, in investing
their funds, and in voting their shares in a socially responsible
manner"
38
In National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel,39 the D.C. Circuit
held that the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) established
standing through allegations of informational injury under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA).4 0
31. 794 F. Supp. at 398.
32. 782 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1992).
33. Los Angeles v. National Highway Saftey Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
34. Public Citizen, 782 F. Supp. 144. The plaintiffs challenged the Office of the
United States Trade Representative's failure to prepare an EIS assessing the poten-
tial impacts of trade agreements under negotiation, thus allegedly impairing their
effort to educate Congress and the public about the environmental ramifications of
the trade agreements.
35. Informational standing also has been successfully asserted under non-environ-
mental substantive statutes. See, eg., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice, 491 U.S. 440, 449-51 (1989)(granting informational standing under Federal
Advisory Committee Act); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373-75
(1982)(granting informational standing under Fair Housing Act of 1968); Action Al-
iance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other
grounds, 494 U.S. 1001 (1990)(granting informational standing under Age Discrimi-
nation Act); see also infra part III.B.1 (discussing informational injury under
EPCRA).
36. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Securities Exch. Comm'n, 389 F.
Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
37. NRDC brought suit under two federal securities laws, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-b (1987), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-11 (1990). The SEC issued the regulations in response to Congress's
passage of NEPA requiring disclosure of information in the public interest.
38. 389 F. Supp. at 697.
39. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988).
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NWF had challenged twenty-one different regulations promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Interior. The court determined that
the affiants were injured when the Secretary delegated authority
to approve mining plans on federal lands in contravention of SM-
CRA.41 By this delegation, the Secretary denied NWF their right
to participate in the federal decision making process under the
statute. Specifically, the affiants lost the "distinctive federal sub-
stantive right" to have an environmental impact statement pre-
pared.42 Citing five cases43 for the proposition that the denial of
access to government-provided information constitutes injury-in-
fact, the court determined that SMCRA dictated a similar re-
sult.44 The Court of Appeals concluded that "for affiants voicing
environmental concerns like those in the aforementioned affida-
vits, the elimination of the opportunity to see and use an EIS
prepared under federal law does constitute sufficient injury on
which to ground standing." 45 Thus, through alleging informa-
tional harm, NWF was able to establish standing.46
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter,47 two animal welfare
organizations challenged the Secretary of the USDA and the Ad-
ministrator of the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service for
promulgating regulations under the Federal Laboratory Animal
Welfare Act 48 that failed to include birds, rats, and mice as "ani-
mals" within the Act's protection and reporting requirements.
41. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 712. Under SMCRA, a state may agree to regulate mining
operations on federal land, but the Act also provides that "[n]othing in this subsec-
tion shall be construed as authorizing the Secretary to delegate to the States his duty
to approve mining plans on Federal lands ...." 30 U.S.C. § 1273(c)(1988).
42. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 712.
43. Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986),
vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1001 (1990); Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786 (9th
Cir. 1975); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v.
United States Dep't of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978); Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 389 F.Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
44. Hodel, 839 F.2d at 712.
45. Id.
46. Similarly, see City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Safety Admin., 912
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting standing to environmental group to challenge
NHTSA's decision reducing minimum mileage requirements for automobiles with-
out first preparing an EIS evaluating the impact of such reductions on the global
greenhouse effect.) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1225 (1992).
47. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Yeutter, 760 F. Supp. 923 (D.D.C. 1991).
48. Like NEPA, the Act does not have a citizen suit provision, thus requiring the
court to consider plaintiffs' challenge under the APA. However, unlike NEPA, the
Act contains substantive mandates that, when violated, give rise to a viable claim of
informational injury even when such claim is the sole ground upon which to grant
standing.
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The organizations alleged that the defendants' failure to include
rats, mice, and birds injured their ability to disseminate informa-
tion to their members about the treatment and conditions of
these fauna.
The court held that plaintiffs' informational injury claim sur-
vived defendants' motion to dismiss. The claim fell within the
Act's zone of interests and satisfied the requirement that an ac-
tivity germane to plaintiffs' organizational purpose had been
"significantly hindered. '49 The court further held that the causa-
tion and redressability elements of standing had been met in that
an order requiring USDA to issue the regulations would cure
plaintiffs' alleged injury.50
Thus, while informational injury originated under NEPA, its
future under NEPA is uncertain. However, substantive environ-
mental statutes such as those in Animal Legal Defense Fund are a
more effective mechanism to gain standing to redress informa-
tion-based harms.5 1
B. Origins and Development of Procedural Injury
Each federal circuit court to consider the question has found
standing to require federal agencies and private parties to com-
ply with procedural mandates of both environmental and non-
environmental statutes.52 Although widely recognized under
substantive statutes,53 the origins and development of the
concept of procedural injury are grounded in NEPA's EIS
requirement.
49. 760 F. Supp. at 927.
50. Id. at 927 n.6.
51. When substantive environmental statutes contain a citizen suit provision, the
viability of such information-based claims is further enhanced. See infra part III.B.1
(discussing informational standing under EPCRA).
52. See, e.g., McGarry v. Secretary of the Treasury, 853 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir.
1988); Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 932 (9th Cir. 1988).
modified, 850 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1988); Motor Coach Indus., Inc. v. Dole, 725 F.2d
958, 964 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984); Munoz-Mendoza v. Pierce, 711 F.2d 421, 428 (1st Cir.
1983); South East Lake View Neighbors v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 685
F.2d 1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1982). These cases all stand for the proposition that a
violation of a procedural right itself - not the substantive injury caused by the
procedural violation - can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. See Amicus Brief
of the States of Texas, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Vermont and the Cities of New York,
Baltimore, Denver, Elizabeth, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle and Broward
County in Support of Respondents at 5-6, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992)(No. 90-1424)(hereinafter Defenders Amicus Brief).
53. See infra part III.
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In City of Davis v. Coleman,54 the Ninth Circuit became the
first federal court of appeals to identify procedural injury as a
separate and distinct form of injury that may satisfy the Article
III standing requirements. The court held that the Federal High-
way Administration's failure to prepare an EIS for a proposed
highway interchange project constituted a procedural injury to
the plaintiff, City of Davis. The court stated that "the procedural
injury implicit in the agency failure to prepare an EIS ... is itself
a sufficient 'injury-in-fact' to support standing. ' 55 However, the
court further stated that a plaintiff alleging procedural injury
must have a sufficient "geographical nexus" to the site of the
challenged project such that the plaintiff may be expected to suf-
fer whatever environmental consequences the project may
have.5 6 Because of the city's proximity to the project site, the
court reasoned that the city had demonstrated such a nexus in
that the challenged project might have adversely affected the
city's water supply and controlled population growth policy.57
Subsequently, in Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel,5 8 the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff environmental organizations had
standing as a result of procedural harm suffered under NEPA.
The Secretary of the Interior had sought to submit a legislative
environmental impact statement (LEIS) to Congress regarding
oil and gas drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) without allowing a period for public comment. The
court held that the Secretary's decision to submit the LEIS with-
out first providing an opportunity for public notice and comment
violated NEPA and its implementing regulations. Rejecting the
government's contention that the Trustees lacked standing be-
cause impairment of their members' use of the ANWR could
only be accomplished by Congress choosing to eliminate the stat-
utory prohibition against gas and oil development in the refuge,
the court held that the plaintiffs had a "procedural right" to com-
ment on the LEIS.59 Citing City of Davis, the court ruled that
the Trustees had standing to challenge alleged agency violations
of this procedural right.6°
54. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
55. Id. at 671.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel, 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
59. Id. at 1378.
60. Id. (citing City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671-72.)
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING
One year later, the Ninth Circuit handed down Oregon Envi-
ronmental Council v. Kunzman,61 a case in which the court up-
held the plaintiff's standing under NEPA. Oregon
Environmental Council (OEC), an environmental group, had
sought to enjoin a government pesticide spraying program aimed
at eradicating gypsy moths. OEC established standing on the ba-
sis of alleged failures in the preparation of an EIS calculating the
harmful effects of the pesticides. The court held that "procedural
failures in EIS preparation create a risk that environmental im-
pacts will be overlooked and provide sufficient 'injury in fact' to
support standing.
'62
The court noted that the case did not present a situation al-
lowing just anyone, including individuals residing in states with-
out gypsy moths, to bring an action to stop the spraying. OEC's
members resided in a state (Oregon) with an actual gypsy moth
problem. Thus, as in City of Davis, the plaintiffs had "a sufficient
geographical nexus to the site of the challenged project that
[they] may be expected to suffer whatever environmental conse-
quences the project may have" and could challenge a nationwide
EIS.63
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Lujan,64 the district
court held that plaintiff NRDC had successfully alleged proce-
dural harm. NRDC sued under NEPA to challenge the adequacy
of a legislative impact statement (LEIS) concerning the future
management of the Alaskan Wildlife National Refuge. The
court determined that the requirement of an adequate environ-
mental impact statement for legislative proposals could be en-
forced by a private action. The plaintiffs proved a risk that
serious environmental impacts would be overlooked and that
they had a geographic nexus to the challenged action.6 In addi-
tion, the court found that "plaintiffs' participation rights are
within the interests protected by the statute" since an LEIS is
"intended by Congress to provide detailed environmental infor-
mation to the public to permit them to participate in a meaning-
ful way in further decision making both at the administrative and
legislative levels."'66
61. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987)
62. Id at 491 (citing City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 670-71).
63. Id- (quoting City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671)
64. 768 F. Supp. 870 (D.D.C. 1991)
65. Id. at 877-78.
66. Id at 878 (citation omitted).
1994]
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Although courts first recognized procedural injury in environ-
mental cases under NEPA, plaintiffs also have successfully as-
serted procedural injury under substantive statutes.67
Substantive environmental laws 68 differ from procedural statutes
such as NEPA. The former espouse environmental protection as
their primary purpose and offer substantive remedies to prevail-
ing plaintiffs, such as monetary damages or injunctions against
environmentally destructive practices.69 In contrast, the latter
merely grant relief in the form of directives to follow mandated
procedures.
70
Environmental organizations first began to assert procedural
injuries under substantive statutes in the early 1970s. Although
the term "procedural injury" had not yet been coined, the court
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin71 held that EDF
had standing to challenge the USDA for the "procedural" harm
caused by USDA's failure to act on a petition calling for the ban
of the pesticide DDT. The plaintiffs had sued under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),72 asking
the USDA to cancel DDT's registration and, in the interim, to
suspend its use. FIFRA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
67. See Miriam S. Wolok, Note, Standing for Environmental Groups: Procedural
Injury as Injury-in-Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 184 (1992). The note cites nu-
merous instances of groups representing interests other than environmental protec-
tion that have also alleged procedural injury under the following statutes: Staggers
Railroad Act of 1980 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988), United IYansp. Union v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 891 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act 29 U.S.C. § 1381 (1988), Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.
1988); Ethics in Government Act 2 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817
(9th Cir. 1986); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act 7 U.S.C. § 2041 (1988),
Alvarez v. Longboy, 697 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1983); Age Discrimination Act 42
U.S.C. § 6101 (1988), Action Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia v.
Heckler, 789 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1001
(1990); Education for All Handicapped Children Act 20 U.S.C. § 821 (1988), Geor-
gia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983); Federal
Election Campaign Act 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1988 & Supp. 11990), National Conservative
Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 626 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
68. Such statutes include the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA, or
Clean Water Ae), Clean Air Act (CAA), Endangered Species Act (ESA), Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Marine
Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), Oil Pollution Act (OPA), Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA), and Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).
69. Wolok, supra note 67, at 184.
70. 1&
71. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
72. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y (1990).
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cancel the registration of a "misbranded" pesticide, a chemical
that cannot adequately be made safe for the public through
proper labeling.73 In addition, the Act grants the Secretary
power to suspend such a registration immediately if such action is
necessary to prevent an imminent hazard to the public.
74
As to standing, the court rejected the government's contention
"that only registrants and applicants for registration have stand-
ing to challenge the [Secretary of Agriculture's] determinations
under the Act."'75 Instead, FIFRA afforded a right of review to
"any person who will be adversely affected by an order."76 EDF
asserted that the Secretary's failure to restrict the use of DDT in
the environment would cause biological harm to humans and to
other living things. The court held that "consumers of regulated
products and services have standing to protect the public interest
in the proper administration of a regulatory system enacted for
their benefit." 77 Thus, EDF was able to establish standing based
on procedural injury.
In Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy,78 the court found
standing based on procedural injury under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) 79 and the National De-
fense Authorization Act of 1987 (NDAA). 80 Friends of the
Earth (FOE) sought to enjoin the Navy from taking any action to
establish a homeport in Puget Sound until it had completed an
environmental review of the shoreline impacts of the project.81
FOE's members lived near the harbor and used the shoreline and
waters of Puget Sound for environmental, scientific, economic,
73. 7 U.S.C. § 135f.
74. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1).
75. 428 F.2d at 1096.
76. 7 U.S.C. § 135b (d).
77. 428 F.2d at 1097.
78. Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. The Clean Water Act requires the Navy to comply with all state and local
requirements concerning the discharge of dredged and fill materials and the control
of water pollution. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1323, 1344(t).
80. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661
(1986) (NDAA for 1987). Section 2207 of the NDAA for 1987 prohibits the Navy
from spending funds for construction of a homeport until "all Federal, state, and
local permits required for the dredging activities to be carried out with respect to
homeporting at Everett, Washington, have been issued."
81. The review of environmental effects in the harbor was conducted pursuant to
Washington's Shoreline Management Act. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 90.58.010 - .930. The
Navy had already been granted a permit by the Army Corps of Engineers to dredge
the harbor. FOE claimed that such dredging would release a large quantity of heavy
metals that lay at the bottom of the harbor.
1994]
358 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 12:345
and recreational activities. They alleged that, without adequate
environmental review and protection, the construction of the
homeport would directly and adversely affect the plaintiff mem-
bers' interests in the Sound.
In light of the purpose of the Clean Water Act and of the
NDAA, the Ninth Circuit determined that FOE had suffered a
procedural injury. Like NEPA, both statutes required the con-
sideration of environmental impacts before the commencement
of government action.82 Thus, when the Navy announced that
dredging would begin before the completion of environmental
review, the plaintiffs were harmed by "the creation of a risk that
serious environmental impacts will be overlooked.
'83
Friends of the Earth represented an important development in
the law of procedural injury. For the first time since procedural
injury was officially recognized in City of Davis, procedural harm
formed the basis of standing under a substantive environmental
statute. Arguably, an assertion of procedural harm brought
under the citizen suit provision of a substantive environmental
statute like the Clean Water Act should suffice alone to establish
standing regardless of the plaintiffs' proximity to the challenged
action. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit continued to apply the
geographic nexus test that had been used in previous cases in-
volving procedural claims under NEPA.
II.
DEFENDERS
A. The Eighth Circuit's Decision
In Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan,84 the Eighth Circuit upheld
the plaintiff's standing on the basis of substantive and procedural
injuries. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Friends of the Earth, the
Eighth Circuit found that procedural injury alone established
Defenders' standing and that geographic proximity to the chal-
lenged agency action was not required. Plaintiff Defenders sued
the Secretary of the Interior, challenging a 1986 rule promul-
gated by the Secretary interpreting the consultation provision 8s
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).86 Under the Secretary's
82. Friends of the Earth, 841 F.2d at 932.
83. IM (quoting City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 671) (citation omitted).
84. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990), rev'd, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (a)(2).
86. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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original interpretation of the consultation provision in 1978, fed-
eral agencies were required to consult with the Secretary regard-
ing the effects on endangered species of agency projects in the
United States and in other countries.87 The 1986 regulation re-
moved the consultation requirement for federal agency actions
occurring in foreign countries. 88
Defenders identified three foreign projects that had not been
and would not be subjected to the consultation requirement in
the future if the new regulation remained in effect. Amy Skil-
bred, a member of Defenders, stated that she had observed wild-
life in the area of the proposed Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka
and that she intended to return in the future to view fauna in the
project area. She stated that she would be harmed by the
Mahaweli project because of its likely adverse impact on the
wildlife. Joyce Kelly, the president of Defenders, claimed that
she had visited Egypt and would suffer harm from the Bureau of
Reclamation's Aswan High Dam Project. She also expressed the
intent to return to the area in the future. Finally, J. Campbell
Plowden asserted that he had visited Peru within several hundred
miles of the Picchis-Palcazu project, and that he intended to re-
turn to Peru to view wildlife. 9 Thus, none of Defenders' mem-
bers lived in these foreign countries, nor did any have concrete
plans to return.90
Defenders premised their claim of procedural injury on the as-
sumption that the failure of the Secretary of the Interior to con-
sult with agencies regarding the effects of projects in other
countries created a risk that endangered species in those areas
(and hence Defenders' interest in observing these species) would
be harmed. The Court of Appeals held that Defenders had set
forth specific facts adequate to show procedural injury; Defend-
ers established that the benefits flowing from the procedures at
issue were an objective of the statute and also identified the
agency action that was the source of its injuries, as required by
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.04 (1978).
88. 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1993).
89. Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National wildlife Federa-
tion, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), the Eighth Circuit determined that Plowden's affidavit was
insufficient to establish substantive injury since he only came within several hundred
miles of the project. 911 F.2d at 121.
90. Id at 120-21.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation.91
The Eighth Circuit rejected the Secretary's contention that De-
fenders had to show a "geographical nexus" to the challenged
agency projects. Citing the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Fernandez
v. Brock,92 the Defenders court noted that subsequent to City of
Davis, the Ninth Circuit had decided cases that indicated that the
geographical nexus test was "not determinative." 93 As a result,
the Eighth Circuit followed the procedural injury approach set
out by the Ninth Circuit in Fernandez, that "[to] determine[e]
whether a given statutory duty creates a correlative procedural
right, we look to the statutory language, the statutory purpose,
and the legislative history. '94 Thus, the Eighth Circuit became
the first court to use a correlative rights approach in an environ-
mental case to determine whether a party had suffered proce-
dural harm.
Applying the Fernandez test, the Eighth Circuit determined
that the ESA created a correlative procedural right in all citizens
to challenge violations of the ESA committed by government of-
ficials. The citizen suit provision of the ESA provides that "any
person" may commence a suit to enjoin any government official
91. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). In NWF, the Court
stated that plaintiffs must identify a specific agency action that they wish to
challenge.
92. Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988). In Fernandez, migrant
workers challenged the Secretary of Labor's failure to promulgate regulations that
would grant them benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). The court examined ERISA's language, purpose and legislative history to
determine whether the Secretary of Labor's duties under the Act created "correla-
tive procedural rights" in the plaintiffs. Without applying the geographical nexus
requirement, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing on the ground that the
Secretary's failure to promulgate the regulation violated the plaintiffs' procedural
rights under ERISA.
93. Defenders, 911 F.2d at 121.
94. Id. (quoting Fernandez, 840 F.2d at 630). The Ninth Circuit also used this
approach in two other cases, Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986), and
Alvarez v. Longboy, 697 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1983). Using the correlative rights ap-
proach in these two cases, the Ninth Circuit found in one that the statute created
correlative rights, while in the other, the statute did not create such rights and the
plaintiff's procedural injury claim failed. In Dellums, the court reversed the district
court's finding of standing based on procedural injury, holding that the Ethics in
Government Act is not a statute designed to establish a correlative procedural right
in members of the public. In Alvarez, the court found that the plaintiff had alleged
procedural harm under the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, where the stat-
utory language, purpose, and legislative history indicated that Congress intended to
create procedural rights in farm workers.
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alleged to be in violation of the Act.95 Furthermore, the Act's
ambitious purpose supported the construction that Congress in-
tended to bestow procedural rights upon environmental organi-
zations such as Defenders.96 The legislative history of the ESA
also bolstered the conclusion that procedural rights may be
enforced.97
The Court of Appeals found especially persuasive the Supreme
Court's description of the strength of the Act in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill.98 In Hill, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
pointed omission of the type of qualifying language previously
included in endangered species legislation reveals a conscious de-
cision by Congress to give endangered species priority over the
'primary missions' of federal agencies." 99 Since the ESA created
procedural rights, Defenders could sue based on the Secretary's
alleged violations of the statute's procedural requirements. The
Eighth Circuit held that Defenders had standing on the basis of
both substantive injury and procedural injury to challenge the
new regulation, and that the regulation was invalid.
Defenders was a case in which government failure to follow
procedures created the danger of overlooking an environmental
risk. The Eighth Circuit likened the Secretary's failure to consult
with the action agencies regarding the effects on endangered spe-
cies to the NEPA cases of Trustees for Alaska v. Hodel10° and
Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman1 01 where failures in
the EIS process created enforceable procedural rights. All of
these decisions demonstrate the courts' concern that if the gov-
ernment does not follow procedural safeguards mandated by
Congress, environmental degradation may be overlooked, in turn
causing harm to the plaintiff's interests. Strict adherence to
these safeguards becomes more important in cases like Friends of
the Earth and Defenders where a substantive statute is in-
volved.10 2 Not only do the procedures ensure that environmental
consequences are considered, as with NEPA, but the safeguards
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
96. This "ambitious purpose" was emphasized by the Supreme Court in the snail
darter case, where the Court stated "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this
statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the
cost." Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
97. Defenders, 911 F.2d at 121.
98. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
99. Id. at 185.
100. 806 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986).
101. 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987).
102. See infra part III.B.
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ensure the achievement of Congress's substantive goals relating
to environmental protection.
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. Overview
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit. 103
Declining to reach the merits of the case, six justices found that
Defenders lacked standing to challenge the Secretary's regula-
tion. Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justice Souter,
joined the majority opinion except for the portion addressing
whether Defenders' injury was redressable. Justice Kennedy also
wrote separately to emphasize that he did not share the major-
ity's virtually categorical dismissal of some of Defenders' claimed
injuries. Justice Stevens, although disagreeing with the majority
that Defenders lacked standing, concurred in the judgment, rea-
soning that Congress did not intend the consultation provision of
the ESA to apply overseas. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
O'Connor, dissented, arguing that Defenders had standing to
challenge the regulation.
2. Majority Opinion
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia noted that to survive the
summary judgment motion, Defenders must set forth by affidavit
or other evidence specific facts to support their claim. He stated
that standing is more difficult for a party to establish in a case
like Defenders, since third parties (the federal agencies involved
in the overseas projects) were the actual objects of the govern-
ment action or inaction at issue.
In this context, Defenders' affidavits of substantive injury were
insufficient. While the desire to observe an animal species is "un-
deniably a cognizable injury for the purpose of standing," affida-
vits submitted by Amy Skilbred and Joyce Kelly claiming an
intent to revisit project sites in the future did not demonstrate an
"imminent" injury.10 4 Justice Scalia harshly rejected Defenders'
other theories of substantive injury including the "inelegantly
styled" "ecosystem nexus" approach. He reasoned that such an
approach would be inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Lu-
103. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
104. Id. at 2138.
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jan v. National Wildlife Federation105 since it would not require
member use of the challenged area.1°6
In his dissent in Defenders, Justice Blackmun (one of the four
dissenters in National Wildlife Federation) disputed Justice
Scalia's assertion that NWF had established a general rule that "a
plaintiff claiming injury from environmental damage must use
the area affected by the challenged activity." 10 7 Justice Black-
mun stated that in NWF, the particular harm (visual enjoyment
of nature undisrupted by mining activities) required specific geo-
graphic proximity because "[o]ne cannot suffer from the sight of
a ruined landscape without being close enough to see the sites
actually mined."'0 However, many actions may cause environ-
mental injuries geographically remote from the areas immedi-
ately affected by the challenged action. As a result, "[i]t cannot
be seriously contended that a litigant's failure to use the precise
or exact site where animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste
is dumped into a river means he or she cannot show injury."' 0 9
Whatever the original scope of the Court's decision in NWF
regarding member use, in Defenders, Justice Scalia established a
member use requirement for plaintiffs alleging substantive injury.
Such a requirement will likely be fatal in a case such as Defenders
where the party challenging the government action neither lives
near the challenged area nor is a frequent user of the affected
resource. 110
a. Three Acceptable Forms of Procedural Injury
Justice Scalia also rejected Defenders' procedural injury claim.
Scalia disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning that because
§ 7(a)(2) of the ESA required interagency consultation, the citi-
zen suit provision of the ESA created a procedural right author-
105. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). In NWF the Court,
per Justice Scalia, held 5-4 that an environmental organization did not have standing
under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge several Bureau of
Land Management regulations regarding strip mining. The Court determined that
NWF had failed to establish substantive injury because the affidavit provided by an
N'WF member alleged that he used land "in the vicinity" of the area challenged
under the regulations. Id. at 885.
106. 112 S. Ct. at 2139.
107. Id. at 2154 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Basing standing on alleged procedural and informational harms may offer
plaintiffs an opportunity to avoid the substantive injury requirement established in
Defenders.
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izing 'anyone' to file suit in federal court to challenge the
Secretary's failure to consult with the relevant agency."' Justice
Scalia first distinguished Defenders' injuries from three types of
procedural injury that would, in his view, satisfy standing re-
quirements. First, Defenders was not seeking to enforce a proce-
dural requirement, "the disregard of which could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs. 11 2 The majority's examples
of this type of injury included the requirement of a hearing prior
to the denial of a license application and the filing of an environ-
mental impact statement (EIS) before a federal facility is con-
structed next door to the plaintiff.1 3 In comparison, Scalia found
the Defenders plaintiffs on "the other side of the country" from
the alleged harm." 4 Second, Defenders was not a case where
concrete injury was suffered by many persons, as in a mass tort
situation." 5 Finally, it was not the "unusual case in which Con-
gress has created a concrete private interest in the outcome of a
suit against a private party for the government's benefit, by pro-
viding a cash bounty for the victorious plaintiff.""116
b. Critique of the Eighth Circuit's Decision
Justice Scalia then critiqued the basis of the Eighth Circuit's
procedural injury holding. In his view, the Court of Appeals had
held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied by
"congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-con-
tained, non-instrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe
the procedures required by law. 1" 7 Rejecting this notion, Justice
Scalia replied:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally
available grievance about government - claiming only harm to his
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitu-
111. 112 S. Ct. at 2142 (emphasis in original).
112. Id.
113. Although the Supreme Court did not specifically address the geographic
nexus requirement, from this example, Justice Scalia would appear to consider such
a nexus to be a "separate concrete interest."
114. Defenders' members did not live near the challenged projects in Peru, Sri
Lanka, or Egypt, nor could any of these individuals submit concrete proof when, or
even if, they might return abroad to view wildlife.
115. 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
116. Id. One commentator has suggested that Congress amend the citizen suit
provisions in this manner to override any negative effects of the Defenders decision.
See Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Arti-
cle II, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
117. 112 S. Ct. at 2143.
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tion and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly
benefits him than it does the public at large - does not state an
Article III case or controversy.
118
Justice Scalia focused on what he considered to be the weak
facts of Defenders' claimed substantive injury, and therefore
viewed Defenders' procedural injury claim as nothing more than
a mere interest that the executive branch "take Care that the
Laws be carefully executed." 1 9 In essence, Justice Scalia per-
ceived Defenders' procedural injury as an "abstract, self-con-
tained, non-instrumental right" to have the executive branch
follow those procedures mandated by law.120 To claim standing,
Justice Scalia would require that plaintiffs show that a procedural
violation would "impair a separate concrete interest of theirs."1 21
Thus, Justice Scalia apparently rejected the Eighth Circuit's
"correlative rights" approach to determine procedural harm,
whereby the court examined the statutory language, purpose,
and legislative history of the ESA to determine whether Con-
gress had created correlative procedural rights that could be en-
forced by the plaintiffs. Scalia did not ascertain Defenders'
procedural rights based on the language, purpose, and legislative
history of the ESA as a whole, but instead made a determination
based on the text of the ESA citizen suit provision as applied to
his interpretation of the facts alleged by Defenders.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not mention the Supreme
Court's decision in Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educa-
tion Fund, issued one year before Defenders.1' 2 The Court, in a
unanimous eight-member decision (Justice Scalia did not partici-
pate), quoted a law review article for the proposition that "stand-
ing 'should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable
by reference to the statutory and constitutional provision whose
protection is invoked.' ""23 In the majority opinion in Defenders,
however, Justice Scalia did leave the door open for a correlative
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2145 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3). These weak facts for substan-
tive injury were that none of Defenders' members lived in the same country or area
as the projects and that none of these members could state definitively when they
would return to the project areas.
120. Id. at 2143.
121. Id. at 2142.
122. Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991).
123. Id. at 77 (quoting William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE
LJ. 221 (1988)); see also George K. Pash, Note, NEPA: As Procedure It Stands, As
Procedure It Falls: Standing and Substantive Review In Idaho Conservation League
v. Mumma, 29 WiLumE-rrn L. REV. 365, 388-89 (1993).
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rights type approach in some instances, maintaining that nothing
in the Defenders' holding "contradicts the principle that '[t]he ...
injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 'statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.' "124
He specifically cited two cases in which Congress had elevated
harms that were previously inadequate in law to the status of le-
gally cognizable injuries.125 However, Defenders' interest in en-
forcing the consultation provision of the Endangered Species Act
was apparently not sufficiently "concrete" to rise to this level.
3. Kennedy Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote separately to
emphasize that Congress possesses the power to define new
rights of action that "do not have clear analogs in our common-
law tradition."'1 26 However, Justice Kennedy determined that
Congress did not use this power in the ESA. 127 The citizen suit
provision of the Act did not identify the injury Congress sought
to vindicate and relate that injury to the class of persons entitled
to bring suit. The provision did not pass muster because, while
the ESA purported to confer a right on "'any person.., to en-
join .. . the United States and any other governmental . ..
agency.., alleged to be in violation of this chapter,"' the ESA
did not of its own force establish that there is an injury in "any
person" by virtue of any "violation.' 28
Since the plaintiffs in Defenders did not present compelling
facts that their interest in protecting endangered species would
124. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975))
(citation omitted).
125. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205 (1972) (injury to an indi-
vidual's personal interest in living in a racially integrated community); Hardin v.
Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (injury to a company's interest in market-
ing its product free from competition). Since it appears that Justice Scalia favors
more of the individual rights or private law models of standing that predominated
between the late 1930s and early 1960s, it is somewhat ironic that Scalia cited the
Hardin decision. Hardin was one of the first instances where the Court moved away
from the private law model of standing and recognized that regulatory beneficiaries
could suffer from a legal injury in the form of harm to their statutorily protected
interests.
126. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 2147; see also James M. McElfish Jr., Drafting Standing Affidavits After
Defenders: In the Court's Own Words, 23 ENvrL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10026,
10028 (January 1993).
128. 112 S. Ct. at 2147 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Interestingly, unlike Justice
Scalia's preoccupation with separation of powers concerns, Justice Kennedy ap-
peared to consider the primary function of requiring a concrete injury to "preserve
the vitality of the adversarial process." Id.
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actually be harmed through a failure of the agencies and the Sec-
retary to consult, it was easier for Justice Scalia to view the plain-
tiff's claim as a mere abstract interest that the executive branch
enforce the ESA's procedures. If the plaintiffs lived somewhere
near the species or, as Justice Kennedy stated, had "concrete
plans" to return and see the animals, the Court certainly would
have been presented with a case in which the omission of a pro-
cedural duty would have substantive implications.
4. Blackmun's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the ESA's con-
sultation provision is "an action-forcing procedure designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest" - the interest of
those who observe and work with endangered species in protect-
ing those species against extinction. 129 Thus, unlike Justice
Scalia, Blackmun examined the consultation provision and inter-
est being protected by the procedure - the value of preserving
endangered species and their habitats. Justice Blackmun stated
that "some classes of procedural duties are so enmeshed with the
prevention of a substantive, concrete harm that an individual
plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of in-
jury just through breach of that procedural duty."'130
Like the appellate courts in Friends of the Earth and Defend-
ers, Justice Blackmun reasoned that government failure to follow
procedural safeguards could lead to substantive environmental
harm.' 31 In addition, he posited that the courts owe significant
deference to Congress's substantive purpose in imposing proce-
dural requirements such as the ESA's consultation provision.132
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun characterized Justice Scalia's
opinion as "a slash-and-burn expedition through the law of envi-
ronmental standing."' 133 The question remains, however, as to
the nature and degree of the impact of Defenders on procedural
injury as an independent basis of fulfilling the standing require-
ment. Although Justice Scalia made it fairly clear that he be-
lieved that procedural injury will rarely provide an independent
129. Id. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
130. Id
131. Id. at 2160.
132. One federal district court has endorsed Justice Blackmun's interpretation in
a case brought under NEPA. Colorado Envt'l Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364
(D. Colo. 1992). See infra part III A for a detailed discussion of this case.
133. 112 S. Ct. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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basis for satisfying standing requirements, Justice Kennedy's con-
currence (joined by Justice Souter) and Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent (joined by Justice O'Connor) leave the door open for
procedural injury to provide an independent basis for stand-
ing.134 In addition, Defenders did not preclude the establishment
of injury-in-fact through an allegation of both procedural and
informational harm.
III.
POST-DEFENDERS PROCEDURAL AND INFORMATIONAL
INJURY ANALYSIS
Several cases have addressed procedural and informational in-
jury claims in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in De-
fenders. Four of these cases involved challenges that were
brought primarily under NEPA,135 while others addressed claims
under substantive environmental statutes, including EPCRA,
ESA, MMPA, CERCLA, RCRA, and the FWPCA.136
A. Procedural and Informational Injury Alleged in NEPA
Cases
In the first post-Defenders case, Colorado Environmental Coa-
lition v. Lujan,137 the Colorado Environmental Coalition (CEC)
and several other environmental organizations challenged the
decision of the Secretary of Interior to remove five wilderness
study areas from wilderness recommendation without preparing
a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS). Plain-
tiffs had asserted standing on the basis of substantive injury, in-
formational injury, and procedural injury. The district court
found that CEC had standing to sue the Secretary under NEPA.
Both the informational and procedural injury claims were
based on the failure of the Secretary to prepare an SEIS pursu-
134. Also, Justice Stevens would have granted standing to Defenders on these
facts, thus establishing a five justice majority to grant standing on the basis of proce-
dural injury.
135. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3446 (Jan. 11, 1994); Fund for Animals v.
Espy, 814 F. Supp. 142 (D.D.C. 1993); Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470
(D. Or. 1992); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
136. See, e.g., Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England
Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993); Heart of America Northwest v. West-
inghouse Hanford Co., 820 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Wash. 1993); Swan View Coalition v.
Iurner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
137. Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
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ant to NEPA. In support of its informational injury claim, CEC
presented several affidavits indicating that the alleged violation
of NEPA deprived their organization of information, thereby ad-
versely affecting the function of their organization. The court
found that CEC's informational injury fell within the zone of in-
terests sought to be protected by NEPA and that the plaintiffs
had standing based on this alleged injury in combination with the
other asserted injuries.
The court next rejected the defendant's argument that CEC's
procedural injury under NEPA was not cognizable. NEPA re-
quires the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact
statement if:
(i) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action
that are relevant to environmental concerns; or (ii) There are sig-
nificant new circumstances or information relevant to environmen-
tal concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. 1'
First, the court found Colorado Environmental Coalition to be a
case involving a procedure described by Justice Blackmun in his
Defenders dissent, in which a procedural duty is "so enmeshed
with the prevention of a substantive, concrete harm that a plain-
tiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of injury
just through the breach of that procedural duty."'139 Although
NEPA simply prescribes the necessary process and does not
mandate particular results, these procedures are almost certain to
affect the agency's substantive decision.140 If the Secretary's rec-
ommendations to the President are based on a violation of the
procedural safeguards mandated by Congress, the violations will
affect the agency's substantive decision. 41 Furthermore, the
court stated that "courts owe substantial deference to Congress'
substantive purpose in imposing a certain procedural require-
ment,"'142 such as the SEIS requirement mandated by NEPA.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1) (1993).
139. 803 F. Supp. at 368 (citing Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2160 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
140. Id. at 369 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
350 (1989))
141. 803 F. Supp. at 368.
142. Id. (citing Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2160 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Later in
the opinion, the district court again used language from Justice Blackmun's dissent,
this time to address separation of powers concerns:
Just as Congress does not violate separation of powers by structuring the proce-
dural manner in which the executive branch shall carry out the laws, surely the
federal courts do not violate [the] separation of powers when, at the very instruc-
tion and command of Congress, they enforce these procedures.
19941
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Second, the court emphasized that the SEIS requirement was
the type of procedure cited by the majority in Defenders, "the
disregard of which could impair a separate concrete interest of
[plaintiffs]."'143 To support this finding, the district court used
one of Justice Scalia's examples of a "separate concrete interest,"
namely "the procedural requirement for an environmental im-
pact statement before a federal facility is constructed next door
[to the plaintiffs]."'144 Here, a CEC member, James Geheres, was
a long-standing user of the two areas in dispute. Thus, the court
found that "the instant action is 'a case where plaintiffs are seek-
ing to enforce a procedural requirement the disregard of which
could impair a separate concrete interest of theirs.' ",145 As a re-
sult, the court determined that CEC had established standing by
alleging procedural harm.
Another post-Defenders decision, Douglas County v. Lujan,14 6
also found that plaintiffs had established standing under a theory
of procedural injury. Douglas County sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) had violated
NEPA and ESA when it designated a habitat for the northern
spotted owl. The county sought an injunction prohibiting the
FWS from taking any action to designate a critical habitat until it
prepared an environmental impact statement or environmental
assessment.
The court held that the government's failure to follow NEPA
procedures designed to ensure that it had adequately considered
the environmental consequences of the proposed action was suf-
ficient to support standing. 47 Using a City of Davis analysis, the
court stated that a procedural injury alone suffices for standing if
the injury is alleged by a plaintiff "having a sufficient geographi-
cal nexus to the site of the challenged project that he may be
expected to suffer whatever environmental consequences the
project may have."'148 Since Douglas County was situated such
that it would incur any environmental consequences of the spot-
ted owl designation, such a nexus existed in the case.
Id. at 370.
143. Id. at 368 (quoting Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2142).
144. Id. (quoting Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2142) (emphasis omitted).
145. Id. at 368 (quoting Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2143 n.8)
146. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992).
147. Id. at 1476.
148. Id. at 1476 (quoting Friends of the Earth, 841 F.2d at 932, and City of Davis,
521 F.2d at 671).
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The Douglas County court also invoked the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision in Oregon Environmental Council v. Kunzman, 49 rejecting
the notion that NWF had called Kunzman into question. In
Kunzman, the court noted that "[p]rocedural failures in EIS
preparation create a risk that environmental impacts will be
overlooked and provide sufficient 'injury-in-fact' to support
standing."'150 The Douglas County court found that NWFs re-
quirement that the plaintiff demonstrate that he or she has been
"actually affected" within the meaning of the relevant statute "is
really nothing more than a restatement of the 'geographical
nexus' test .... "151 To bolster its reasoning, the court cited Jus-
tice Scalia's proposition that "one living adjacent to the site for
proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to
challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an [EIS], even
though the dam will not be completed for many years."'
5 2
In the third district court case, The Fund for Animals, Inc. v.
Espy,153 a nonprofit organization dedicated to the prevention of
cruelty to animals sought a preliminary injunction under NEPA
to prevent a Department of Agriculture research study involving
the capture of wild bison from outside the boundary of Yellow-
stone National Park.154 The Fund asserted a procedural injury
on the basis of the agency's failure to prepare an EIS or an EA
or to determine whether the project was exempt from either re-
quirement. The court ruled that the Fund had satisfied the pro-
cedural injury requirements set out in Defenders.
Initially, the court discussed plaintiffs' contention that Defend-
ers was distinguishable because "the entire fabric of NEPA is
fundamentally procedural, and the Act would be rendered impo-
tent in the absence of plaintiffs' standing premised on 'mere' pro-
cedural injury.' 55 Although the court found "some appeal" to
this argument, it stressed that the Court's holding in Defenders
149. Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987).
150. Douglas County, 810 F. Supp. at 1476-77 (quoting Knazman, 817 F.2d at
491).
151. 810 F. Supp. at 1477.
152. Id (quoting Defenders, 112 S. CL at 2142 n.7).
153. 814 F. Supp. 142 (D.D.C. 1993).
154. The objective of the research program was to mitigate or eliminate the po-
tential spread of the disease brucellosis to domestic cattle. The project involved
capturing 10 to 60 pregnant wild bison from just outside the boundary of their
habitat, Yellowstone National Park, transporting them by truck 2000 miles to Texas,
artificially infecting the bison with the microorganism brucella, corralling them in
Texas with cattle, and after a few months of study, slaughtering the bison. Id. at 145.
155. Id. at 149.
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was based on the requirements of the Constitution; therefore
"the particular statute alone cannot cure such a defect. ' 156
The court then determined that the plaintiffs met the strict
standing requirements of Defenders. The Fund established
standing by submitting undisputed evidence that defendant's ap-
proval and imminent implementation of the program threatened
the combination of: (1) plaintiffs' procedural right to the notice
and reasoned process required of defendant by NEPA; and (2)
the concrete, aesthetic viewing interest of the two Fund members
and of the individual plaintiffs in the Yellowstone bison, particu-
larly those bison that had been attracted from the wild and
threatened with an inhumane process of destruction by the
program.157
In Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Al-
cock, 58 the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs' standing on the
basis of allegations of procedural harm due to violations of
NEPA, ESA, and National Forest Management Act. The court
held that timber companies and their trade association lacked
standing to sue the Forest Service for a policy preserving the red
cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species.
The Secretaries of the Interior, the Forest Service, and the Fish
and Wildlife Service had engaged in consultation pursuant to
§ 7(a)(2) of the ESA,159 to ensure that agency actions were not
likely to jeopardize the woodpecker's survival. As a result, the
Forest Service submitted a plan to ensure the continued existence
of the woodpecker. However, when the plan failed to halt the
decline in woodpecker population, the Forest Service announced
a new policy for any timber contracts issued in the woodpecker's
habitat. This policy strictly limited the permissible methods for
harvesting within 3/4 mile of a woodpecker colony. The timber
companies whose contracts were affected by the policy filed suit,
claiming that the government had violated NEPA, ESA, and
156. Id. This statement by the Espy court is inconsistent with Defenders.
Although it is true that the holding in Defenders was based on Article III of the
Constitution, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Kennedy questioned the principle
that injury-in-fact may exist solely by virtue of a violation of a statute creating legal
rights. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2145; Id. at 2146-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
157. Several Fund members had previously seen bison killed near Yellowstone
and intended to view the free-roaming bison in that area in the future. 814 F. Supp.
at 149.
158. Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800
(11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3446 (Jan. 11, 1994).
159. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The same statutory provision was at issue in
Defenders.
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NFMA. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the timber companies' as-
sertions of economic, environmental, and procedural injuries.
After finding that the timber companies did not have cogniza-
ble economic or environmental injuries, the court discussed the
alleged procedural injury, which was, in essence, a claim of infor-
mational harm. The Council claimed that the failure of the For-
est Service to comply with the procedures mandated by NEPA,
ESA, and NFMA in adopting the woodpecker policy injured
their rights to information, participation, and informed decision
making. The Eleventh Circuit held that, as in Defenders, the pro-
cedural harm alleged was "nothing more than [a] generalized
grievance which fail[s] to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
for standing."'16 Alcock was "not a case where the failure to fol-
low a mandated procedure caused a distinct injury different from
that suffered by the public generally." 161 The asserted rights to
information, participation, and informed decision making "were
not peculiar to the ... timber companies, but are rather shared
by all citizens."'162 This characteristic made the case distinguish-
able from Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng,163 which
noted that the right to information might support standing where
the purpose of the organization was to provide information to
the public.164
Viewed as a whole, the four post-Defenders cases brought
under NEPA indicate that Defenders did not close the door on
the use of procedural and informational injury claims to establish
standing. In three of the four cases, the courts determined that
the plaintiffs had alleged sufficiently procedural injury to estab-
lish standing. The courts in these decisions all distinguished De-
fenders on its facts while the Colorado Environmental Coalition
court principally cited Justice Blackmun's dissent in its reasoning.
The CEC case may prove to be an important step in recognizing
that a government failure to follow procedures with substantive
implications may form a basis for standing. In addition, the Al-
cock court intimated that an environmental group whose purpose
was the dissemination of information to the public might well
have been granted standing.' 65 Thus, these cases indicate an
160. 993 F.2d at 810.
161. Id n.16.
162. Id. at 810.
163. 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
164. Alcock, 993 F.2d at 810 n.16.
165. Id
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evolving trend toward finding standing in NEPA cases on the ba-
sis of procedural and informational injury.
B. Procedural and Informational Injury Under Substantive
Environmental Statutes
1. Informational Injury Under EPCRA
In enacting the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA), 166 Congress sought to provide the public
with information on hazardous chemicals existing within their
communities and establish reporting, notification, and planning
requirements to aid state and local governments in preparing for
and dealing with an emergency caused by the release of a hazard-
ous chemical.' 67 EPCRA contains a citizen suit provision 68 au-
thorizing citizens to bring civil actions against owners or
operators of a facility who fail to: (1) submit an emergency no-
tice under § 304;169 (2) submit material safety data sheets under
§ 311;170 (3) complete and submit an inventory form under
§ 312;171 or (4) complete and submit a toxic chemical release
form under § 313.172 Citizens may also bring actions against the
EPA, state governors, or State Emergency Response Commis-
sions for failing to provide a mechanism for public access to EP-
CRA information. 73 Thus, the citizen suit provision authorizing
166. 42 U.S.C. § 11001-11050 (1988).
167. H.R. CONF. Rm,. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3374.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1988).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 11004 (1988).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 11021 (1988).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1988).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988). In addition to EPCRA, several other major envi-
ronmental statutes containing citizen suit provisions impose release reporting obliga-
tions. See, e.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (requiring that a facility with
knowledge of a release of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance report the
release immediately to the National Response Center); Clean Water Act Regula-
tions, 40 C.F.R. pts. 100-140, 400-471 (requiring any person in charge of a vessel or
an on-shore or off-shore facility to notify immediately the appropriate government
agency of unpermitted spills or releases of oil or a designated hazardous substance in
excess of a reportable quantity into navigable waters of the United States); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pts. 240-271 (requiring that
all leaks from hazardous waste storage tanks above a de minimis level must be re-
ported immediately to federal and state regulatory authorities); Safe Drinking Water
Act Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pts. 144-47 (requiring underground well operators to
inform the state within 24 hours if the well is not in compliance with its permits
under the Underground Injection Control Program).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(C).
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suits for specific information-based violations of the Act provides
fertile ground for the successful assertion of informational injury.
In a post-Defenders decision on informational injury under
EPCRA, Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition v. Kurz-Hastings,174
the court held that two environmental organizations had standing
to challenge a company for filing late and inaccurate toxic chemi-
cal release forms (Form R's) under EPCRA § 313. Plaintiffs as-
serted that they had standing on the ground that they were
required to expend time and money to uncover defendant's vio-
lation, which had a restrictive effect on plaintiffs' efforts to dis-
seminate information regarding their programs. Plaintiffs further
alleged that their members lived, worked, and traveled past or
near defendant's manufacturing plant where the alleged violation
occurred.
In granting plaintiffs standing, the court reasoned that the pur-
pose behind EPCRA is defeated when parties subject to its re-
quirements fail to file accurate information in a timely manner,
because such failure may inhibit "the conduct of research and
data gathering or the ability to aid in the development of appro-
priate regulations, guidelines, and standards."' 75 The court dis-
tinguished Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng 176 on the
ground that the court in Lyng decided that case on judicial re-
view grounds under the APA. In addition, with respect to Form
R's that contain inaccurate information, the court noted with
caution that "a ruling that 'knowing' failures to file accurate in-
formation with the EPA are not subject to rectification by citizen
suits would defeat the purposes of citizen suits." 17
7
Relying on Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition, the court in At-
lantic States Legal Foundation v. Buffalo Envelope 78 granted in-
formational standing under EPCRA. Plaintiff Atlantic States
Legal Foundation (ASLF) contended that defendant's failure to
fie the required information under EPCRA caused informa-
tional injuries to the organization, including the local govern-
ment's inability to develop comprehensive disaster plans to
address potential releases of toxic chemicals and the environ-
mental researchers' inability to compile accurate inventories of
174. 813 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
175. Id at 1139-40.
176. 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
177. Delaware Valley Toxics Coaltion, 813 F. Supp. at 1142.
178. 823 F. Supp. 1065 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). The same court also granted standing
based on informational injury under EPCRA in a companion case, Atlantic States
Legal Found. v. P.M. Refining Inc., No. 91-CV-436S (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1993).
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toxic chemical users. The court cited the same statutory lan-
guage as the court in Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition179 in find-
ing that ASLF had properly alleged informational injury.
Relying on § 313(h), the court reasoned that the failure to file
information under EPCRA regarding the release of toxic chemi-
cals into the environment is "precisely the type of injury that EP-
CRA is supposed to redress" in that such a failure to report may
inhibit the conduct of research and data gathering or the ability
to aid in the development of appropriate regulations, guidelines
or standards. 80
Unlike NEPA, EPCRA contains a citizen suit provision to en-
force its information-based mandates on governmental and pri-
vate entities. In addition, courts have granted standing for
information-based claims under EPRCA's citizen suit provision,
even when such claims are asserted independently of procedural
and substantive injury claims. Thus, informational injury claims
have proven much more successful under EPRCA than under
NEPA.
2. Procedural and Informational Injury Under the
Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act of 1973181 (ESA) offers a hybrid
of statutorily authorized informational injury as contained in EP-
CRA (due to its informational focus and citizen suit provision)
and NEPA-based procedural injury (through the procedures that
agencies must undertake to ensure against jeopardizing endan-
gered or threatened species). The Act is one of the most impor-
tant and powerful environmental laws in the United States.182 It
requires all federal agencies to use their full authority to con-
serve both endangered and threatened species.183 Sections 4184
179. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
180. 823 F. Supp. at 1071 (citing Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition, 813 F. Supp. at
1139); see also Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 491 U.S. 904 (1989) (granting standing under Clean Water Act to environ-
mental organization for company's failure to file reports concerning harmful
effluents).
181. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
182. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1977) (describing the
ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered spe-
cies ever enacted by any nation").
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1544.
184. Id. § 1533.
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and 7185 are the principal action-forcing mechanisms to attain this
goal.
ESA section 4 governs the listing process through which en-
dangered and threatened species are identified. After the Secre-
tary of the Interior initiates or receives a petition from a party,
and after an extensive series of procedural steps intended to en-
sure public notice and participation and the collection of infor-
mation,'86 the Secretary must decide whether to list a species. If
the species is listed, the Secretary must designate critical habitat
at the time of listing.'17
Section 7(a)(2) provides: "Each federal agency shall, in con-
sultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, ensure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency
... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any en-
dangered or threatened species."'18 After consulting with an
agency, the Secretary must provide the agency with a written
statement outlining the Secretary's opinion as to how the
agency's action would affect the species.18 9 If the Secretary finds
that the agency action is "likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of the species,"' 90 the Secretary must suggest reasonable
and prudent alternatives that he believes the agency can take
without violating Section 7(a)(2).
Courts have held that the consultation process is not op-
tional.' 91 Consultation does not guarantee a substantive out-
come but is designed to ensure compliance with substantive
provisions of the Act. 9 2 The end result of consultation under
185. Id. § 1536.
186. Id. § 1533(b)(5) - 1533(b)(8) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
187. Id § 1533(b)(2).
188. Id. § 1536(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
189. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(a). When the consultation process is finished, the Fish and
Wildlife Service must provide the federal agency with its opinion. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(g)(1993).
190. "Jeopardize the continued existence of'" means to engage in an action that
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likeli-
hood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild by reducing the
reproduction, numbers, or distribution of the species. 50 C.F.RI § 402.02 (1993).
191. See, eg., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1976);
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 979 (1976) (cited in Defenders Anzicus Brief, supra note 52, at 7-8).
192. When assessing an agency's compliance with the ESA, courts give substantial
weight to "biological opinions" produced by the Secretary during the consultation
process. See Reply Memorandum for Sierra Club in Support of Partial Summary
Judgment and Opposition to Federal Defendants' and Defendant-Intervenor's Mo-
tions for Summary Judgment at 14, Swan View Coalition v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923
(No. CV89-121-H-CCL) (hereinafter Sierra Club Reply Memorandum).
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section 7 is the issuance of a biological opinion by FWS, 193 analo-
gous to the preparation of an EIS under NEPA. 194 Plaintiffs can
gain standing under the ESA to require that the consultation
process be carried out, irrespective of the substantive results of
such consultation; requiring that consultation lead to a specific
substantive outcome in order to establish standing would lead to
absurd results.195
Courts have likened ESA's procedural and informational man-
dates to those required under NEPA.196 In fact, the need for
compliance with the ESA's procedures is even greater than the
need for compliance with NEPA. For instance, in Thomas v. Pe-
terson, 97 the Ninth Circuit noted:
[T]he strict substantive provisions of the ESA justify more strin-
gent enforcement of its procedural requirements, because the pro-
cedural requirements are designed to ensure compliance with the
substantive provisions. The ESA's procedural requirements call
for a systematic determination of the effects of a federal project on
endangered species. If a project is allowed to proceed without sub-
stantial compliance with those procedural requirements, there can
be no assurance that a violation of the ESA's substantive provi-
sions will not result.
198
In a post-Defenders case brought under the ESA, Swan View
Coalition, Inc. v. Turner,199 a district court used a City of Davis
analysis to determine whether plaintiffs had proved procedural
injury. A coalition of environmental organizations sued the di-
rector and other officials of the Fish and Wildlife Service for an
alleged violation of the Endangered Species Act. The plaintiffs
based their procedural injury on the failure of FWS to prepare an
adequate, comprehensive biological opinion concerning the im-
193. Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Tbrner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 928 (D. Mont. 1992).
194. Biological opinions and EIS's both involve potential injury to plaintiffs aris-
ing out of the increased risk that environmental harm will result from defendants'
failure to comply with statutory requirements to analyze expected environmental
impacts of a proposed action and to develop alternatives to minimize such impacts.
See Sierra Club Reply Memorandum, supra note 192, at 7.
195. See, e.g., EPCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 11003, 11022 ("It would be, for example, diffi-
cult to prove the substantive results of an emergency evacuation plan or an inven-
tory of toxic chemicals."), cited in Defenders Amicus Brief, supra note 52, at 11.
196. See, e.g., Connor v. Burford, 605 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Mont. 1985), aff'd, 848
F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1012 (1989), cited in Sierra Club
Reply Memorandum, supra note 192, at 13; Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Trner, 824
F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
197. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985).
198. Id. at 764.
199. Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992).
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pacts on endangered and threatened species of the Forest Ser-
vice's adoption of the Flathead National Forest Plan.20
The court held that FWS's alleged failure to provide an ade-
quate biological opinion resulted in procedural and substantive
injuries to the environmental organizations whose members reg-
ularly enjoyed observation of listed species within affected forest
areas.20' The court stated that the Ninth Circuit has long recog-
nized procedural injury as an independent basis for proving in-
jury-in-fact. However, since the Supreme Court had ruled in
Defenders that the citizen suit provision of the ESA does not cre-
ate an abstract right to have the government follow procedures,
the plaintiff "must himself [be] among the injured." 202 The Swan
View Coalition court reasoned that the requirement that mem-
bers personally incur an injury is akin to the City of Davis geo-
graphical nexus standard.
The court determined that the affidavits submitted by the
plaintiffs established that they would in fact suffer procedural
and substantive harm. The affidavits set out in specific detail the
members' recreational, aesthetic, and other uses (including the
observation of endangered species) in the affected areas of Flat-
head National Forest. Thus, the plaintiffs proved "under both
the procedural and substantive injury theories that their mem-
bers have a concrete personal interest in the protection of
threatened or endangered species in the Flathead National For-
est and that their members would be ... adversely affected by
any failure to protect those species. ' '203
The Swan View Coalition case illustrates the confusion that
may result if a court analyzes substantive injury first and then
separately examines procedural injury according to a geographi-
cal nexus test. The court itself noted that substantive and proce-
dural injury are "inherently connected" in this case. As a result
200. Several endangered species, including the grizzly bear, grey wolf, and pere-
grine falcon live in Flathead National Forest.
201. Although not a component of the court's holding, plaintiffs also alleged in-
formational injury, contending that FWS's failure to prepare a biological opinion
that fully comports with the requirements of ESA § 7 deprived plaintiffs of a critical
source of information. The challenged biological opinion would include a detailed
discussion of the effect of the forest plan on the threatened and endangered species
that inhabit the Flathead National Forest, information that is central to plaintiffs'
organizational activities and necessary to fulfill their organizational purposes. Sierra
Club Reply Memorandum, supra note 192, at 8-9.
202. Swan View Coalition, 824 F. Supp. at 929 (quoting Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at
2137).
203. ld. at 930.
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of this approach, a court examines the same factors in the plain-
tiff's affidavits (foremost, proximity of the plaintiff to the chal-
lenged action) to determine the viability of both substantive and
procedural injuries.
This approach reveals a negative implication of the Defenders
decision, where the Court, by holding that a procedural injury
will not suffice to establish standing unless a "separate concrete
interest" is implicated, has effectively merged the inquiries re-
garding substantive and procedural injury. Justice Blackmun
noted that in some cases, the "separate concrete interest" is so
intertwined with the procedural safeguard, that a mere violation
of that procedure should invoke a procedural harm sufficient to
sustain injury-in-fact. This aspect of the majority's approach was
likely Justice Blackmun's cause of concern when he stated "I
have the greatest of sympathy for the courts across the country
that will struggle to understand the Court's standardless exposi-
tion of [the procedural injury] concept today." 112 S. Ct. at 2158
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Under the analysis arising out of the
majority's opinion in Defenders, even if an agency's failure to
comply with the procedural requirements could result in a viola-
tion of the substance of the ESA, the interest in enforcing these
requirements would not become "concrete" unless the plaintiff
was somehow geographically situated near the affected land.
In language that may pave the way for enhanced use of proce-
dural injury as a weapon against agency statutory violations, the
Swan View Coalition court noted in support of its standing
holding:
Unquestionably, the formal consultation procedures at issue in this
case are designed to protect the Plaintiffs' concrete interest in the
preservation of listed species in the Flathead National Forest.
Therefore, a failure by FWS to comply with these procedural re-
quirements and provide an adequate biological opinion at the for-
est plan stage could result in an impermissible violation of ESA's
substantive requirements. To hold otherwise would be to assume
'that Congress imposed useless procedural safeguards,' and that
because the Forest Plan authorizes no site-specific activities, the
biological opinion concerning the plan 'is a superfluous step.' 2°
4
The court recognized the viability of plaintiffs' standing under
the ESA's citizen suit provision to seek redress for alleged proce-
dural violations that are inextricably connected to the substantive
mandates of the ESA, such as the failure to conduct consultation
204. Id. at 931 (citation omitted).
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under § 7. Like Justice Blackmun in Defenders, the court viewed
the ESA consultation provision as "a procedural dut[y] so en-
meshed with the prevention of a substantive concrete harm that
an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a sufficient
likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural
duty."20 5 However, the court also felt bound to engage in an
analysis of the plaintiff's "separate concrete interest" to deter-
mine whether they had successfully alleged procedural harm.
3. Possible Broader Applications: Procedural Injury Under
CERCLA, RCRA, CWA, and MMPA.
In Heart of America Northwest v. Westinghouse Hanford
Co., °6 the court held that the plaintiff citizens' group (HOAN)
had standing under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).207 HOAN alleged substantive and
procedural injuries arising from the release of contaminated
water into the Columbia River. Its members charged Westing-
house and the Department of Energy with failure to report re-
leases of hazardous substances into the river as required by
RCRA and CERCLA. Violation of the members' right to use
the area of the river near the Westinghouse nuclear facility with-
out being exposed to harmful pollutants allegedly released with-
out proper notice formed the crux of the plaintiffs' substantive
injury claim.208 HOAN's members also alleged procedural injury
to their right to receive timely notice of any release from the fa-
cility so that they could take necessary precautionary steps.209
Rejecting the government's assertion that HOAN's claims of
substantive injury were merely generalized grievances, the court
found that the plaintiffs alleged "numerous instances of specific
injury in fact. ' 210 Two of HOAN's members detailed in affidavits
their routine use of the affected area, as well as how the alleged
releases immediately threatened their use of the area. The court
205. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2159 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Heart of Am. Northwest v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 820 F. Supp. 1265
(E.D. Wash. 1993).
207. Although the plaintiffs established standing under these statutes, the court
dismissed the case, finding the claims barred as challenges to activities within a
cleanup plan governed by CERCLA. Id at 1283.
208. Id. at 1270.
209. Id. at 1271.
210. Id. at 1270.
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found these affidavits consistent with Defenders, according to
which, a "member's alleged injury-in-fact must be supported by
concrete plans to revisit the area where they would suffer impact
of the proposed action. '
21'
Regarding HOAN's claim of procedural harm, the right to be
notified of certain releases under § 111(g) of CERCLA,212 the
court was not persuaded that Defenders precluded standing in
this case. The court reasoned that, in Defenders, the Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff had not successfully alleged sub-
stantive injury to any of its members and, having so found, held
that Defenders' alleged procedural violation was not enough, in
and of itself, to confer standing.21 3 However, in the case before
it, HOAN's members alleged specific individual injury to legally
protected interests, making the case distinguishable from De-
fenders, and placing the case "squarely in line" with cases cited
by the Defenders court where plaintiffs had standing to sue to
enforce procedural violations designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest of the plaintiffs.21
4
As in Swan View Coalition, the court in HOAN read Defenders
as effectively merging the determinations of substantive and pro-
cedural harm. It reasoned that since the plaintiffs, through mem-
ber affidavits, had alleged substantive injury, only then did it
follow that they could sue on a procedural violation of
CERCLA.
Requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate substantive injury in order
to create an enforceable procedural right, however, undermines
both the utility of using procedural injury to establish standing
and the substantive purpose of substantive environmental stat-
utes if a plaintiff cannot show use of the area in question. The
citizen suit provision of CERCLA, much like that of the Endan-
gered Species Act, allows any person to sue for an alleged viola-
tion of any requirement under the statute.215 Since CERCLA is
a substantive environmental statute, the violation of its proce-
dural safeguards such as the notice requirement may result in di-
rect harm to individuals from hazardous chemicals and should be
enforceable regardless of whether the plaintiffs have other con-
211. Id. at 1271 (citing Defenders, 112 S.Ct. at 2137-38).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(g).
213. 820 F. Supp. at 1272.
214. Id. at 1273.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1).
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crete interests such as member use that may demonstrate sub-
stantive injury.
In Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New
England Aquarium,216 several organizations dedicated to
preventing cruelty to animals (hereinafter CEASE) sued an
aquarium and the Navy under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act (MMPA).217 CEASE challenged the transfer of the dolphin
"Kama" from New England Aquarium to the Navy for military
use. The court granted the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing on
the basis of alleged substantive, procedural, and informational
harms.
Since the MMPA does not contain a citizen suit provision,
CEASE filed suit under § 702 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).218 The plaintiffs claimed that the transfer of the
dolphin was executed in violation of the "taking" provision of the
MMPA, which prohibits the transfer of a marine mammal with-
out a permit issued by the Department of Commerce (DOC).219
The permit process requires the publication of permit applica-
tions, with opportunity for public comment, and a hearing if re-
quested by any "interested party." In this case, the dolphin
Kama was not transferred by permit, but by a letter of agreement
issued by the DOC to the Navy and the Aquarium.m
CEASE alleged substantive injuries to their aesthetic and con-
servational interests both from being unable to see Kama in the
Aquarium and from the resulting reduction in the number of
wild dolphins available for observation and study. 21 While ac-
knowledging that such interest could support standing, the dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiff's claims. The court found that
Kama was not regularly on display at the Aquarium, CEASE's
members produced no evidence that they had ever seen Kama,
and that three years had elapsed before CEASE noticed Kama's
absence from the Aquarium. Furthermore, the plaintiffs offered
216. Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation v. New England Aqua-
rium, 836 F. Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993).
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1978).
218. 5 U.S.C. § 702. This section provides: A person suffering legal wrong be-
cause of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of the relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.
219. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(a).
220. 836 F. Supp. at 47.
221. 1&
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no evidence that any depletion of wild dolphins had occurred or
was likely to occur in any particular place. 22
CEASE claimed procedural injury based on the transfer pur-
suant to the letter of agreement, which deprived the organization
of public notice, opportunity to comment, and a public hearing
on Kama's fate. Citing Defenders, the court ruled that there was
no distinct or palpable injury to the plaintiffs as a result of their
inability to participate in the permit process. 223 Since the plain-
tiffs could not show "any injury apart from that suffered by the
public at large," CEASE could not establish standing on the ba-
sis of procedural injury. 2 4 Even though the organization's inter-
est in the dolphin's transfer was different from that of the general
public, the court held that the inability of the plaintiffs to show
that a disregard of the "procedural requirement could impair a
separate concrete interest of theirs" was fatal to CEASE's proce-
dural injury claim.22-
Apart from standing to sue on behalf of its members, CEASE
argued that it had standing for injury to the organization itself.
To support this contention, the plaintiffs alleged procedural and
informational harm. Specifically, CEASE cited DOC's practice
of refusing to require permits in order to transfer dolphins. In
addition, plaintiffs asserted that modifying permits without public
notice rendered the organization unable to participate in public
affairs concerning activities affecting the marine mammal popula-
tion or to disseminate information about such activities to their
members.
In response to this argument, the court underscored the inter-
action between procedural and informational injuries:
The plaintiffs' memoranda interweave their arguments concerning
procedural and informational harm. This interweaving is easily un-
derstandable because the strongest argument which can be made
concerning informational harm is that the improper failure of the
government to disseminate information injures the ability of orga-
nizations and their members to participate in the political process
to promote public policies they prefer. Adequate information
about government activity is important to the exercise of funda-
mental political rights, including the rights to vote, to speak and
write in an effort to influence the votes of others, and to lobby
222. Id. at 51-52.




Congress and the President. In this sense, informational rights are
instrumental to the exercise of procedural rights; the two rights are
integrally related.
2 6
While the court adeptly stated in theory the interrelation be-
tween procedural and informational harms, it nonetheless failed
to address whether the plaintiffs had established standing
through a combination of procedural and informational harms.
Instead, the court reasoned that since the Supreme Court had
held in Defenders that procedural harm alone on the facts of the
case could not establish standing, then "it necessarily follows that
informational harm alone is insufficient to establish standing."w
The New England Aquarium case is an important one in envi-
ronmental standing law because of the court's recognition of the
integral relationship between procedural and informational inju-
ries. In environmental law disputes, procedural injury normally
occurs when the government fails to follow the required process
to safeguard an individual's or group's concrete interest in envi-
ronmental protection, while informational injury arises when the
government's failure deprives citizens of the power to protect
these interests themselves. Thus, the main difference between
the two harms exists in who is prevented from protecting the
rights of the public: in procedural injury, the government; in in-
formational injury, the public itself.
It follows that if a governmental failure to follow procedures
mandated by Congress results both in procedural and informa-
tional harm, neither the government nor the public itself can pro-
tect its own interest and therefore the plaintiff must have
standing in order to protect this interest in a court of law. - It
becomes even more important to ensure that proper procedures
are taken to guard against environmental degradation where
Congress has provided substantive mandates in environmental
statutes. While the New England Aquarium court missed an op-
portunity to recognize standing on the basis of a combination of
procedural and informational injury, a better test case would in-
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. This conclusion is not at odds with the Court's statement in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) that "[t]he assumption
that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing to sue, is
not a reason to find standing." Unlike the Schlesinger plaintiffs who sought redress
of a generalized injury, citizen suit plaintiffs seek to protect an interest specifically
created by Congress.
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volve a combined assertion of these injuries brought under a citi-
zen suit provision of a substantive environmental statute.
The courts in Swan View Coalition and Westinghouse inter-
preted Defenders as requiring a linkage between a statutory pro-
cedural interest and member use of the area in question. In
addition to resulting in further confusion of procedural and sub-
stantive injuries, using this type of analysis presents a more sig-
nificant danger - that of undercutting the substantive purpose
in enacting environmental laws. For example, projects in which
local populations are unconcerned with the potential environ-
mental effects of projects with widely shared impacts could be
unreviewable for lack of a willing plaintiff to allege harm with
enough particularity and certainty to obtain standing.229 Simi-
larly, this problem is illustrated by a challenge by an organization
to oil drilling in certain parts of Alaska that, although virtually
inaccessible to humans, offers a safe harbor to endangered spe-
cies.230 Thus, the lack of member use of areas threatened with
environmental harm should not serve as a justification to thwart
Congress's environmental protection goals embodied in the sub-
stantive environmental statutes containing citizen suit provisions.
In the EPCRA context, courts have prevented this from hap-
pening by granting standing if informational injury is successfully
alleged. In cases such as Delaware Valley Toxics Coalition and
Buffalo Envelope, the procedural requirements are the type of
process "so enmeshed with prevention of a substantive, concrete
harm," mentioned by Justice Blackmun in his Defenders dissent,
that a plaintiff can demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of injury
just through the breach of that procedural duty. While courts in
the wake of Defenders have been hesitant to recognize standing
based on procedural harm alone, New England Aquarium pro-
vides some insight on how injury-in-fact may be established
through a combination of procedural and informational harms.
Since Defenders undermined the ability of plaintiffs to use proce-
dural injury as an independent basis of establishing injury-in-fact,
combining assertions of procedural and informational harms of-
fers a vehicle to avoid the potentially restrictive effect of the De-
fenders holding and ensure the attainment of the substantive
goals of Congress.
229. See Gerschwer, supra note 21, at 999.




Procedural and informational injury claims are viable theories
pursuant to which individuals and organizations may enhance
their access to the courts to seek redress of certain classes of en-
vironmental harm. Although both theories are viable when as-
serted independently of one another, post-Defenders decisions
indicate that the prospect of successfully asserting standing in-
creases greatly when informational and procedural claims are al-
leged together or, at a minimum, when such claims are brought
under a substantive environmental statute containing a citizen
suit provision.
When asserted independently of procedural injury, the viabil-
ity of informational injury claims under NEPA remains uncer-
tain, although the Colorado Environmental Coalition case offers
some hope for the beginning of a trend away from the restrictive
effect of Lyng. Yet, apart from the restrictive effect of Lyng and
its progeny, informational injury asserted under NEPA is also
subject to the limitations inherent in NEPA as a procedural stat-
ute that lacks substantive mandates enforceable through a citizen
suit provision.
By contrast, the future of informational standing claims as-
serted under EPCRA looks promising. Unlike NEPA, EPCRA
imposes information-based mandates on governmental and pri-
vate entities, the violation of which is enforceable through the
Act's citizen suit provision. In addition, courts have held that
informational injury claims under EPCRA are viable when as-
serted independently of other procedural and substantive injury
claims.
Procedural injury claims asserted after Defenders have been
largely successful. Although still subject to the difficult and in-
consistently applied geographical nexus requirement, procedural
injury claims are a more viable mechanism than informational
injury claims to gain standing under NEPA. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the Supreme Court's confusion in Defenders with re-
spect to substantive and procedural injury, procedural injury
claims should be brought in conjunction with substantive and in-
formational injury claims where possible. Colorado Environ-
mental Coalition and Swan View Coalition are examples of
successful post-Defenders blending of procedural and informa-
tional injury claims.
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The weak facts in Defenders merely delayed the recognition of
procedural and informational injury as viable mechanisms for the
redress of many different forms of harm alleged under substan-
tive environmental containing citizen suit provisions. Procedural
injury claims brought under major environmental statutes with
citizen suit provisions such as the ESA, RCRA, CERCLA and
CWA have been successful in the post-Defenders context. These
statutes are the most powerful vehicles through which to expand
access to the courts for environmental harms.
Assuming Article III requirements have been met, procedural
and informational injuries asserted together under substantive
environmental statutes containing citizen suit provisions should
suffice to confer standing. However, given the Supreme Court's
reluctance to depart from its reliance on plaintiffs' geographical
proximity to, and member use of, the site of alleged harm, alleg-
ing procedural and informational injury together may merely di-
minish the significance that future courts will place on the
geographical proximity and member use requirements of sub-
stantive injury. Under either scenario, however, this pleading
strategy will help to ensure that Congress's objectives in enacting
substantive environmental laws are achieved more effectively.
